Dependability analysis is a crucial tool in the control of risk that is a result of failures in modern complex industrial systems. This paper proposes a modelling approach that constructs dynamic models of fault-tolerant (FT) systems based on stochastic activity networks (SANs). This approach allows the systematic inclusion of diagnosis performance in the dependability analysis. This SAN model is used jointly with Monte Carlo simulation to assess the impact of the diagnosis performance on the availability of a FT system when various redundancy and maintenance policies are employed.
Introduction
In order to meet the requirement for improved productivity and safety levels in a modern industrial system, it is common for additional components to be added to the existing system or process in order to improve its dependability. These extra components include systems such as supervision or diagnosis systems, control systems and reconfiguration or backup systems. This leads to the creation of autonomous and adaptive systems that are capable of making decisions in a given context. These systems are becoming increasingly complex, and consequently, dependability analysis of these systems is a difficult task. The overall system, i.e. the one composed of the process and its supervision and backup subsystems, is called a fault-tolerant (FT) system. The role of the supervision system is to diagnose the occurrence of faults, i.e. to detect and localize the system's faults whereas that of the backup system is to reconfigure the system once faults have occurred. These components are used to improve the system's reliability. However, these additional systems are not totally reliable and therefore, their performance should be taken into account when assessing the dependability of the FT system.
In fact, fault detection is based on a diagnosis algorithm which defines a procedure to detect a failure based on given tuning parameters. The quality of the detection depends on those parameters, and so are the actions such as reconfiguration and maintenance that need to be performed to recover from faults. This shows that the performance of the diagnosis systems should be considered explicitly when evaluating a system's dependability. In the same way, the dependability information and objectives could be considered in fault detection and isolation (FDI) procedures and thus improve the decision making.
In other words, the diagnosis issue and dependability analysis should be considered jointly in order to improve the system's performance.
There are a few papers in the literature which deal with the interaction between supervision and dependability analysis and design. For example, Bushan and Rengaswamy 1 considered the sensor placement problem by combining a fault diagnostic observation study using signed directed graphs and reliability information in the form of component failure probabilities. Weber et al. 2 proposed an approach that improved the performance of the decision making in fault diagnosis by Centre de Recherche en Automatique de Nancy, Nancy-Université Institut National Polytechnique de Lorraine, France taking into account a priori knowledge of the system/ components' reliabilities. Aslund et al. 3 performed a safety analysis of FT control systems that contained a diagnosis subsystem. They proposed an approach that allowed the inclusion of diagnosis performance in the fault tree analysis in order to evaluate its impact on the overall system safety level. Using this approach, Gustafsson et al. 4 proposed a method that optimized the detection threshold. Bonivento et al. 5 suggested a procedure that used statistical tools for the evaluation of the reliability of diagnostic systems in terms of their ability to avoid generating false alarms and to misdiagnose situations. Castaneda et al. 6 addressed the problem of dynamic reliability estimation of hybrid systems modelled by stochastic hybrid automata. Some diagnosis performances were included in their simulation study. Guenab et al. 7 worked on FT control systems and their reconfiguration. They proposed a control strategy which incorporated both the reliability and dynamic performance of the system for control reconfiguration.
The aim of this paper is to propose a modelling approach which systematically includes a diagnosis system and thus can be used to make dependability analyses of FT systems. Stochastic activity networks (SANs) are used in this paper since they allow the modelling of dynamic systems by incorporating all their possible states, but unlike tools such as automata and Markov processes, this can be done simply and in a compact manner. In addition the proposed modelling approach is combined with Monte Carlo simulations to assess the system's availability and to study the impact of the supervisor performance. The use of simulation is justified by the fact that the considered systems may have non-homogenous components such as active and standby redundancies, repairable components, etc. that may include both discrete and continuous dynamics. This makes an analytical formulation very difficult. This paper is organized as follows: the section 'Dependability analysis' discusses the dependability analysis tools and presents a description of the SAN approach in comparison with the well-known Petri net (PN) approach. The principle of fault detection in diagnosis systems and some of its operational performances are discussed in the section 'Diagnosis analysis: performance measures'. The section 'The SAN modelling of diagnosis performances for dependability analysis of FT systems' is devoted to the presentation of the proposed modelling approach. This procedure is applied to an automated thermal process in the section 'Case study'. This section is presents a simulation study and a discussion of the obtained results. Finally, conclusions are drawn in the 'Conclusions' section.
Dependability analysis
The dependability of a system can be defined as a property that allows its users to have a justified reliance on the service they are delivered. It is described by various non-functional properties such as: reliability, availability, safety and maintainability. 8 The present paper deals essentially with the availability factor. Availability analysis is performed to verify that an item has a satisfactory probability of being operational, and thus is able to achieve its intended objective. 9 Formally, it is the probability that a system, under stated conditions, is operational at a given time.
There are several classic methods for reliability and availability analysis, which can be either static or dynamic, including fault trees, Markov processes and PNs. 10 This section presents a discussion on SANs which are an extension of PNs and are quite similar to generalized stochastic PNs. 11 The structure of a PN consists of a directed weighted bipartite graph defined by a four-tuple PN = (P, T, I, O), where T and P are two distinct sets of vertexes, T = {t 1 , t 2 , ., t n } is a set of transitions and P = {p 1 , p 2 , ., p k } a set of places. A transition can be seen as an event or an action, and a place represents either a condition for the event or a consequence of it. I & P3T is the set input arcs and O & T3P is the set of output arcs. The marking of a PN net is a k-dimension vector which models the system's state, where k is the number of places in the PN.
It is written as
T , where M(p i ) is the number of tokens in place p i .
A stochastic Petri net (SPN) can now be defined by the six-tuple T . L = (l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l n ) is an array of (a possibly marking dependant) firing rates associated with transitions. 12 The firing of a transition is an atomic operation, i.e. tokens are removed from its input place and deposited into its output place in one single operation (as opposed to a timed PN in which the firing operation is divided into three separate phases 13 ). SANs were first introduced by Mogavar and Meyer 14 and used as a modelling formalism for the performance and dependability evaluation of a wide range of systems. 15 An informal definition of SANs in comparison with PNs will now be presented.
1.
Places: as for PNs they can be seen as a state of the modelled system, and are represented graphically by circles ( Figure 1 ). 2. Activities: as for transitions in PNs there are two kinds: instantaneous and timed. The time duration can be either deterministic or stochastic. It also can be marking dependant. In the vocabulary of PNs, it is said that transitions fire whereas in the vocabulary of SANs activities complete. Each activity has a non-zero integer number of case probabilities. 3. Case probabilities: these allow the modelling of the uncertainty about the enabled activity to complete. Here, the term case is used to denote a possible action that may be taken after the completion of an event such as a routing choice in a network, or a failure mode in a faulty system. Cases are graphically represented by small circles on the right side of an activity ( Figure 1 ). Moreover, a case probability distribution can depend on the marking of the network when the activity completes. 4. Input gates: these are used to control the activation or enabling of the activities. An input gate is defined by two functions: the predicate and the input function. The enabling predicate of an input gate defines the condition which enables or activates the activity. It depends on the marking of the gate's input places. An activity is enabled when the predicates of all its input gates are true. When the activity completes, the new marking of its input places is defined by the gate's input function. An input gate is graphically represented by a red triangle, connected to the activity through its flat side using its input arc ( Figure 1 ). 5. Output gates: these are used to change the state of the system when an activity completes. They define the marking change of the output places using the output function. An output gate is graphically represented by a black triangle, connected to the activity through its flat side using its output arc. Each input/output gate is connected to one and only one activity.
An example of a SAN model consisting of the discussed elements is given in Figure 2 . The predicate function of the input gate I_G expresses the enabling condition of the timed activity Timed_A. This latter is enabled if and only if M(P 1 ) = 4 and M(P 2 ) = 2. When this predicate is true, the activity Timed_A will complete after a delay T which is the time duration of the activity. The input function of I_G specifies the new marking of the places P 1 and P 2 after the completion of Timed_A, in this example, M(P 1 )= M(P 1 )-2 and M(P 2 ) = 0. The output function of the output gate O_G defines the marking of place P 3 after the completion of Timed_A, in this example: M(P 3 )=5 x M(P 3 ). The instantaneous activity I_A has three case probabilities, each related to one place. These probabilities are fixed in this example to P(case 1 ) = 0.3, P(case 2 ) = 0.2 and P(case 3 ) = 0.5. This means that I_A has, for example, a 50% chance to complete through to case 3 and a token will be added to place P 2 . As said before, these probabilities depend on the marking of places such as P 3 , which shows the modelling power of the SANs.
Diagnosis analysis: performance measures
The diagnosis system is a key component in FT systems. It allows the detection of faults or the abnormal functioning of components under supervision. In FT systems, FDI allows reactivity, such as initiating reconfiguration actions, to avoid losing the system's function, safety, etc. Consequently, FDI procedures are a key component in improving a system's dependability and several approaches to the design of these procedures have been proposed in the literature (see, for example, Ould Bouamama et al. 16 ). One common way to perform fault detection is to define a set of tests quantities r i , called residuals. A residual is defined as the difference between the measured value of a system variable and its expected value; the latter being estimated using a model of a fault-free system as the observer. In fault-free situations, these residuals should be equal to zero and they are non-zero otherwise. In practice, systems operate in noisy environments and this can affect the residuals and thus, the decision making. Consequently, the residuals r i are compared to a tuning parameter called the threshold J i instead of zero. If r i . J i then the test will result in an alarm.
In a residual evaluation problem based on statistical theory: the hypothesis 'component i is Ok' is called the null hypothesis of a test and is denoted H 0 i . 2, 3 When the supervised component is Ok and the test produces an alarm, the situation is called a false alarm (FA). When the supervised component is down and no alarm is produced the situation is a missed detection (MD). When the supervised component is down and an alarm is produced the situation is a good detection (D), see Table 1 . These probabilities represent measures of the diagnosis performances and the threshold value adjusts the compromise between a small FA probability P FA and MD probability P MD .
The SAN modelling of diagnosis performances for dependability analysis of FT systems
In the reliability literature, it is always assumed that the detection is made with certainty. However, as previously noted, the dependability of a system depends on the quality of the detection. Indeed, FDI procedures have a direct impact on the actions made to recover from faults. The dependability of the system is thus closely related to the performances of the diagnosis system. This section proposes a procedure to model FT systems using SANs, with a systematic inclusion of the diagnosis performance. The objective of this modelling approach is to perform a reliability/availability analysis. Only component failures are considered in this paper.
SAN modelling of physical components
Each physical component C j of the system can be modelled by two places: C (Figure 3 ). This duration can follow any probabilistic distribution such as the exponential distribution function.
If a component C j is repairable, its maintenance action can be modelled by some timed activity connected to place C up j where a token is added when the component is repaired. This activity will not be connected to place C down j but to the diagnosis SAN sub-model since a maintenance activity is performed only if the supervision system diagnoses the failure. Indeed, if the detection is made instantaneously and with certainty, the activity modelling the repair action will connect place C down j to C up j as is the case for automata and Markov processes. However, as previously explained, this repair action depends on the quality of the detection.
SAN modelling of a backup system
A backup component/system is modelled as a physical component by two places fC up Backup , C down Backup g with the initial marking of these places depending on the redundancy policy M 0 (C up Backup ) = 1 for hot active redundancy 0 for cold passive redundancy &
SAN modelling of the diagnosis system
The diagnosis system can be modelled as a generator of three mutually exclusive events: D, FA and MD. Knowing the probability of these, the supervisor can be modelled by a place, called ALGO, with an initial marking of one token (i.e. M 0 (ALGO) = 1). The place ALGO has an output timed activity, named Diag, with four cases probabilities (Figure 4) . The time duration of activity Diag is deterministic. Indeed, in practice the diagnosis decision making is not instantaneous rather it yields its results at regular intervals of time. Thus, it is more realistic to consider that activity Diag will take some time to complete. A step time, T Diag , should be then specified as the activity's deterministic duration.
Each place in {P D , P MD , P FA } is related to one case k (k = 1,2,3) which models the events D, MD and FA, respectively. For a specific network's markings, these cases have the probability of their associated event, i.e. P D P MD and P FA , respectively. Case 4 is added only to satisfy the condition P 4 k = 1 P(case k ) = 1 (where P(case k ) is the probability of case k) and means Figure 3 . The SAN modelling of a physical component C j .
no event is produced by the supervisor. Case 4 is connected to the place ALGO to conserve the token in it when Diag completes through this case in order to enable the activity Diag again. Notice, however, that these probabilities also depend on the markings of the SAN model associated with the supervised component/system. Consider, for example, that a component C k is supervised. Then the probability of each case is given by the following
The SAN model of the diagnosis system satisfies the following
The global SAN modelling
In the final SAN model, each place in P Detection , f P MDetection , P FAlarm g will be related using logic operators such as AND and OR, to activities of other SAN sub-models, such as the components' models, to activate them. For the sake of clarity, the combination of these sub-models will be explained using an example in the following section.
It should be noted that the modelling of the system's components using the SAN approach is quite similar to that using an automata modelling approach since the places of the components in the SAN models are binary and denote the components' states. However, if automata are used, the overall number of model states explodes exponentially as a function of the number of components.
Case study
The proposed modelling approach is illustrated using a simulation study of the process of heating water ( Figure  5(a) ). The aim of this thermal process is to provide water at a given temperature at a constant flowrate. From the automation point of view, the process's inputs are the water flow rate Q i and the power of the electric heater P and the outputs are the temperature of the water T and flowrate Q o . The system has two actuators: the valve and the resistors (R 1 and R 2 ), and three sensors to measure the temperature (SensorT), the flowrate (SensorF) and the water height (SensorH). Since there is a physical relationship between the flowrate and the level of the water 2 the flow and height sensors are considered to be redundant. The flow controller can use both of them. A diagnosis system monitors the flow sensor which makes the reconfiguration to the height sensor possible when an alarm is produced.
The SAN modelling of the process
The described process is composed of two control subsystems: temperature control and flowrate control systems. The functional decomposition and analysis of this automated system can be made based on these two main control functions (details on functional decomposition and analysis can be found in the literature [17] [18] [19] ). To achieve the control function, an automated system should be equipped with actuators, sensors and controllers. Communication networks and software are not considered in this paper. Thus, if one of these components fails, the automated system will either not function at all or it will function at a reduced level ( Figure 5(b) ). Based on this idea of functional decomposition, the SAN-model of this automated process can be derived easily as shown in Figure 6 . For the sake of simplicity, a SAN model will be constructed only for the flowrate control subsystem. The temperature control system is considered as a component with its own failure rate l Temp . It is modelled in Figure 6 at the points Temperature Ctrl Ok and Temperature Ctrl Ko and the timed activity Fail TC models its failure. Every component in this SAN model is modelled at a couple of places: Component Ok for the Up state and Component Ko for the Down state.
The supervised component, here the flow sensor SensorF, is assumed to be repairable and can be maintained each time the supervisor generates an alarm. This action is modelled by the timed activity Repair and place Maint SF. The latter is connected to the instantaneous activities Maint 1 and Maint 2 . The activity Maint 1 can be assimilated into a preventive maintenance order since its input place is FAlarm which models a false alarm. Also, Maint 2 can be taken to be a corrective maintenance order since it has two input places: SensorF Ko and Detection which model the failure detection. It should be noted that the activity Maint 2 plays the role of an AND logic operator since its completion depends on the places SensorF Ko and Detection which should be marked together. When the diagnosis system produces an alarm, either correct or false, the FT system will switch from the flow sensor (SensorF) to the height sensor (SensorH). When the latter is used in standby redundancy, the place SensorH Ok is connected to activities Maint 1 and Maint 2 and will be marked each time an alarm occurs. The place FlowMeasure Ko models the failure of the sensing part in the flow control system. It is connected to activities Sensoring Ko and SF Ko: the first one models the fact that SensorF is turned-off for maintenance and its backup SensorH is down, and the second one models the missed failure of SensorF.
The entire flow control system fails (place Flow Ctrl Ko) if the valve or the controller or the sensing loop is down. This is modelled by activities VC 1 , VC 2 and VC 3 , respectively. These activities are connected to place Flow Ctrl Ko using an OR logic operator. In the same way, the FT system fails (place System Ko) if the temperature control system or the flow control system fails (activities Temp and Flow, respectively). Then the whole FT system can be maintained through the timed activity Maintenance and tokens will be added to all places of type Component Ok if and only if their marking is zero (i.e. the component is down). This condition is expressed in the output gate OG 1 . Since place System Ko can receive more than one token, the input gate IG 1 is used to avoid making a maintenance action more than once at a time. The input function of gate IG 1 is: M(System_Ko) = 0 which models the fact that the FT system is fully repaired after the completion of activity Maintenance.
To study the impact of the diagnosis performances and recovery actions on the availability of the supervised process, four SAN models were designed with various redundancy and maintenance policies, using the Mo¨bius software tool: 
Monte Carlo simulations
Monte Carlo simulation is often used to estimate the dependability factors. In Monte Carlo simulations, randomly generated event streams are used to solve a problem. Each execution of the solution procedure generates a different trajectory through the possible event space of the system, called its history. To get statistically significant estimations, it is necessary to generate many trajectories. The software Mo¨bius can be used to compute confidence intervals as the observations are collected to give an estimate of the accuracy of the calculated estimates. When the desired confidence level for every studied variable is reached, the simulator will stop. The confidence level specifies the desired probability that the exact value of the measured variable will be within a specified interval around the variable estimate. In this study, simulations were conducted over at least 5x10 4 and at most 8 x10 5 histories. Each history has a duration T h of 20,000 time units (t.u.). The simulator stops if the maximum number of histories is reached, or if the discrepancy between the results is less than 5% with a confidence level of 95%, i.e. 95% of the results are contained within an interval of 5% around their mean value. Table 2 shows the values of the timed-activities distribution function parameters used in the simulation study. Here, the failures of components C j follow an exponential distribution with a constant rate l C j .
In the simulation models, it was assumed that a maintenance operator and resources are immediately available when a maintenance action is needed. Its duration was assumed to follow a uniform distribution. The parameters a 1 and b 1 ( a 2 and b 2 , respectively) denote the lower and upper bound of the uniform distribution associated with the timed activity Repair for the supervised component (respectively Maintenance) for the whole system. A maintenance action may in fact end up simply being an inspection action if a false alarm occurs.
Simulation results
The goal of these simulations was to study the impact of the diagnosis system on the mean availability of the FT system. Numerous simulations were conducted with different values of P FA , P MD and P D : P D was set to 80% and the values of P FA and P MD were varied between 1% and 19%. The situation of a certain fault detection was considered (i.e. P D = 1). This assumption, while inaccurate in real life, is widely used in the literature.
The statistics on the time occupation of place System_Ko were used to calculate the mean availability A. If TSystem_Ko is the mean time occupation of place System_Ko, then: A = (1 À T System Ko T h À Á )3100. The simulations were performed on an IntelÒ coreä Duo CPU with a clock speed of 2.26 GHz. The simulation execution time varied, depending on the simulation data and model, from few seconds to about 50 min.
The mean availability results for six different values of P FA and P MD are reported in Figure 7 . It can be seen that globally for all the models, excepted model C, the mean availability increases as the false alarm rate increases. This growth is more significant when maintenance actions are provided to the supervised component (models B and D). In addition, these models give better results than models A and C. This shows that maintaining the supervised component improves the availability of the whole system. This action is possible thanks to the diagnosis action.
The model B, in which standby redundancy is employed, gives the best mean availability. Indeed, the backup sensor (SensorH) is turned-on only when the supervisor alarms and the supervised sensor is turnedoff to be maintained. Once the repair has been completed the system switches back to the principal sensor and the backup sensor is then turned-off. Such a redundancy allows the liquid's flow measurement to be continuous and increases its lifetime. However, when the backup sensor is used in active redundancy, even if the information provided by it is not used in the control loop, the sensor is still functioning, and may fail as well as the principal sensor. This is why the model D gives a lower availability than model B. The contribution of the flow sensing part to the failure of the system in comparison to the other components of the flow control system is shown in Figure 8 . In this figure, the VC j (j = 1, 2, 3) are compared with their corresponding activities VC j of Figure 6 in terms of the number of times that these activities have led to the failure of the system. The contribution of the flow sensing part, i.e. VC 3 , is more important when active redundancy is employed (Figure 8(a) ) than standby redundancy (Figure 8(b) ). For both models B and D, this contribution decreases as false alarm rate increases.
These results show that the combination of the redundancy policy together with the maintenance policy makes one model better than another. They also show that in the studied system, it is better to over detect faults than to miss them, since the availability is improved as the false alarm probability grows. Indeed, when the supervisor alarms, even if the fault is not real, actions such as the reconfiguration and repair of the supervised sensor will increase the system's functioning time. Maintaining a non-faulty component can be assimilated into a preventive maintenance action. Such an action will contribute to reduce the total number of repair actions on the whole system as shown in Figure 9 . Finally, the hypothesis which considers that failure detection is made with certainty is too optimistic as the system's availability is greater than in any other case. In Figures 7 to 9 , it corresponds to the case where the FA rate is zero.
Conclusions
This paper proposed a method to construct dependability models for FT systems using SANs. Combined with Monte Carlo simulation, these models allow the evaluation of dependability factors by including events associated with the supervision system and maintenance actions.
This modelling approach was tested on an example of a heating process. A simulation study was made for this FT system, where different redundancy and maintenance policies were employed. Monte Carlo simulations were used to evaluate the system's mean availability and to study the impact of diagnosis performance and the redundancy and maintenance policies on the system's availability.
The diagnosis performance depends on a design parameter called the threshold. The next step in this this work will be to study the impact of this parameter on the system's dependability. This will require the creation of models for the physical process and its supervisor, and the incorporation of these diagnosis models into the SAN model. fault detection probability (probability of event D) P FA false alarm probability (probability of event FA) P MD missed detection probability (probability of event MD)
